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Authorization & accountability

What's live, what's rolling out

Which authorization controls are enforced today, which are being switched on, and the risks that remain by design.

Status

Control Status
Authority enforced by the ledger contracts, per state Live
Depositor, beneficiary, mediator and verifier separation Live
Release quorum, rising with amount; multi-key officer signing Live
Signed, scoped, expiring mandates for automation Live
Institutions signing with their own hardware-held keys; key ceremonies Live
Wallet sign-in and wallet-signed transactions Live
Signed approval of each draft version, carried on the ledger Live
Personal signature required for every money movement and binding decision Rolling out: counted today, refused once switched on
No release approval by the beneficiary; person-level separation Rolling out
Assurance levels L0-L5, step-up and value escalation Rolling out: specified; step-up proven with our identity provider
Per-person assignment and keys unlocked by the person’s own identity Rolling out
Per-action evidence records in write-once storage; key-use reconciliation Rolling out

How enforcement is switched on

The personal-signature rule runs in a counting mode first: every action that would be refused is recorded, but allowed. Enforcement is switched on environment by environment, once every approver in that environment has a wallet or an approved key and the signed path has been tested end to end. Each switch is a controlled change.

Residual risk, by design

  • A compromised web page can ask a browser wallet to sign while its user is present. Mitigation: the wallet shows what is being signed, and high-risk roles use external or hardware wallets.
  • The check of draft-approval signatures is the platform’s. The ledger can’t verify that signature type itself, so the platform checks it; the signatures themselves are on the ledger, and anyone who holds the contract can re-verify them independently.
  • Automation under a mandate acts without a person, by design. Its scope is exactly the mandate the escrow agent signed, and it should be reviewed with every mandate change.
  • Federated step-up depends on the institution’s identity provider. Forcing a fresh, strong authentication through an institution’s own sign-in is being proven per provider; where it can’t be, the platform’s own enrolled factor or passkey is used instead.